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Abstract
The debate on the right to be forgotten on Google involves the relationship between human information processing and
digital processing by algorithms. The specificity of digital memory is not so much its often discussed inability to forget.
What distinguishes digital memory is, instead, its ability to process information without understanding. Algorithms only
work with data (i.e. with differences) without remembering or forgetting. Merely calculating, algorithms manage to
produce significant results not because they operate in an intelligent way, but because they ‘‘parasitically’’ exploit the
intelligence, the memory, and the attribution of meaning by human actors. The specificity of algorithmic processing makes
it possible to bypass the paradox of remembering to forget, which up to now blocked any human-based forgetting
technique. If you decide to forget some memory, the most immediate effect is drawing attention to it, thereby activating
remembering. Working differently from human intelligence, however, algorithms can implement, for the first time, the
classical insight that it might be possible to reinforce forgetting not by erasing memories but by multiplying them. After
discussing several projects on the web which implicitly adopt this approach, the article concludes by raising some deeper
problems posed when algorithms use data and metadata to produce information that cannot be attributed to any human
being.
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Introduction
The debate raised by the so-called right to be forgotten on
Google shows the difficulties and opportunities associated
with the social consequences of algorithms in the particu-
larly complex issue of the management of memory.
The spread of Big Data and the increasingly active
role of digital procedures in many areas of social life
confront us with situations in which algorithms collect
data, identify correlations, analyze patterns, and
autonomously produce additional information. When
a user does a search on Google, a situation arises in
which neither those who built the machine nor those
who programmed it nor those who entered the data
knew of the output or could have predicted its particu-
larities. The information the user gets cannot properly
be attributed to any of these human agents. If it can be
attributed to anyone or anything, this could only be the
algorithm that accomplishes the search.
This condition produces unprecedented attribution
problems of epistemological, moral, and legal character
(Floridi and Sanders, 2004; Koops et al., 2010; Simon,
2012). Who should be held accountable for the
operation of algorithms and its consequences?
The company that produces the algorithms and the
programmers who design them do not know the data
on which they work and do not control the actual
output of the process. This does not mean of course
that the algorithms work with ‘‘raw data’’ resulting dir-
ectly from the world (boyd and Crawford, 2012;
Gillespie, 2014; Gitelman, 2013; Mittelstadt et al.,
2016) nor that they work in a neutral way.1 The algo-
rithms themselves, however, work without an intention
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The difficulty with these questions is not primarily
the possible attribution of legal status to nonhuman
entities, since this already happens with companies
and organizations.2 The difficulty is, instead, related
to the fact that we are dealing with decisions that are
taken independently by algorithms. And even if algo-
rithms are and remain fully determined (Etzioni, 2016),
the latest developments in programming techniques
show that they are particularly useful when their pro-
cedures do not reproduce the processes of human
rationality (Burrell, 2016: 7). Both in theory and in
practice, therefore, we have to consider the difference
between algorithmic and human data processing, with
its potential implications for the accountability of the
outcomes.
My analysis of these issues will take its point of
departure from the judgment of the European Court
of Justice on 13 March 2014 (causa C-131/12)3 on the
right of citizens to request the removal from web search
results of the links associated with their name, under-
stood as the ‘‘right to be forgotten.’’ The ruling, which
directly addresses the role of algorithms in the process-
ing of social information, raised a lively debate around
the consequences of digitalization for memory. In the
discourse about web memory, algorithms are often
associated with an unprecedented extension of remem-
bering, expressed by the widespread idea that ‘‘the
Internet never forgets,’’4 because data stored in digital
archives can automatically be made available through
search engines. But the situation is, of course, more
complex, since storage and accessibility are, in fact,
two separate issues requiring different tools and differ-
ent decisions. Digital memory remembers a lot but also
forgets a lot, in new and articulated ways. Information
can be lost because it is not stored, because its support
is damaged or because it cannot be accessed with the
available tools.
In web memory, remembering and forgetting are not
two opposing components that negate each other. The
availability of memories can increase together with the
loss of memory (forgetting). To deal with this condi-
tion, I argue, we need a concept of memory more com-
plex than the common idea of an accumulation of
memories. In particular, we need to reevaluate the
active role of forgetting as a necessary component. I
take the problems raised by the legislation to implement
the right to be forgotten on the web as an opportunity
to test a different way of observing social memory and
its technological support.
The paper opens by presenting the ruling of the
European Court of Justice, its motivations, and the
theoretical and practical problems of its implementa-
tion. Many of these problems stem from the difficulty
of dealing with the active role of algorithms in the man-
agement of information. These difficulties, I argue in
the subsequent section, are connected with the fact
that algorithms today do not try to reproduce the
human form of information processing. Algorithms,
as we shall see, do not refer to meanings but directly
to data, i.e. to the underlying differences, which by
themselves are not meaningful. The fact that algorithms
process data and not meanings—now in enormous
quantities and with extraordinary speed—gives rise to
the impression that algorithms can remember every-
thing. But if algorithmic processing is a form of
memory, it faces a task quite different from that con-
fronting human memory: whereas for the latter the
challenge is to remember enough, the challenge for
algorithmic memory is to be able to forget enough
and in a controlled way. Toward the goal of developing
a concept of social memory appropriate to our web
society, in the next section my analysis aims to show
that algorithms, precisely because they operate autono-
mously and differently from human intelligence, can
also provide the tools to manage this problem.
Algorithms can implement, for the first time, the clas-
sical insight that it might be possible to reinforce for-
getting not by erasing memories but by multiplying
them. In the final part of the paper, I briefly discuss
several projects already available on the web that deal
with the management of forgetting from this perspec-
tive. I conclude by addressing the control problems that
remain open when dealing with systems that work with
data produced every moment, often unconsciously, by
users connected with the web and with one another.
The right to be forgotten on the web
The ruling of the European Court of Justice reacts to a
complaint lodged by a Spanish citizen against Google.
The company was accused of infringing his privacy
rights because its search engine made his personal
data accessible to everyone on the web, even if the
event they referred to had been resolved for a number
of years and the reference had become irrelevant. The
Court was asked to judge whether individual citizens
should have the right to make their personal informa-
tion untraceable (the right to be forgotten: §20) after a
certain time simply because they wish it (‘‘without it
being necessary. . . that the inclusion of the information
in question. . . causes prejudice to the data subject’’:
ruling C-131/12, §100). The Court also had to decide
whether the company Google should be held respon-
sible for the processing of personal data and forced to
suppress the links to web pages containing information
on the person in question, even if the information
remains available on the web pages containing it and
its publication is lawful.
The problem to which the European Court reacted
with its judgment is related to the unprecedented role of
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algorithms in the production of social memory. On the
web, data processing uses algorithms, which act on
enormous amount of data, apparently with no limit in
their processing and storage capability. Making infor-
mation accessible to everyone with an internet connec-
tion, the web intensifies the problem of the ‘‘droit a`
l’oubli,’’ which has a long legal tradition starting
from French law. This right protects the desire of a
citizen who has been convicted of a criminal act and
has paid his debt to justice to be no longer remembered
for those past facts and to be able to build a new life
and a new public image. The right to be forgotten is
directly connected with the ability to keep the future
open—a ‘‘right to reinvention’’ (Solove, 2011) that pro-
tects the future of the person from a colonization by the
past. Nietzsche knew it very well, when he spoke of the
‘‘need of oblivion for life,’’5 even more important than
the ability to remember—because without forgetting
one would remain bound to an eternal presence of the
past, which does not allow to build a different future.
Without forgetting you cannot plan nor can you hope.
This is certainly plausible. The judgment of the
European Court recognizes this right for European citi-
zens, and forces Google to remove the links to the per-
sonal data of the ones who request it—unless that
information has public relevance. In a condition in
which search engines give access to the countless
amount of data available on the web, however, the
right to be forgotten protected by the European
Court becomes much more extensive than the classic
‘‘droit a` l’oubli,’’ both materially and socially: it con-
cerns any act (especially those inconsequential on the
penal level but relevant for image and reputation: the
private episodes that Google should make untraceable)
and includes any person (not only criminals but each of
us, particularly teenagers).
This extension of the right inevitably produces social
coordination problems. The forgetting of anyone also
affects the forgetting of others—those who are involved
in the same event and maybe do not want to be forgot-
ten, but also those who may be involved in the future or
interested in similar events, and would like to preserve
the ability to access the relevant information. The pro-
tection of individual forgetting collides with the right to
information and with the creation of a reliable shared
public sphere (Nabi, 2014; Toobin, 2014).
The ruling of the European Court states that the
right to privacy overrules public interest in finding per-
sonal information, unless the person holds a public role
(§ 97). The issue is extremely controversial and fits into
the open debate about the definition and limits of priv-
acy in the web society (Nissenbaum, 2004; Solove,
2007b, 2011).
The solution proposed by the European Court, how-
ever, also raises practical implementation problems,
due to the active role of algorithms. The judgment con-
siders Google accountable and responsible for the
excess of memory in our digital world,6 on the basis
of the principle according to which is responsible ‘‘the
natural or legal person (. . .) which determines the pur-
poses and means of the processing of personal data (. . .)
whether or not by automatic means’’ (§4). Google itself,
on the contrary, claims that it cannot be held respon-
sible, because the processing of data is performed by
the search engine and the company ‘‘has no knowledge
of those data and does not exercise control over the
data’’ (§22). Can the autonomy of the operation of
algorithms relieve the company from the responsibility
for data management?
The European Court denies it, although it distin-
guishes the processing of data by Google from the pro-
cessing by publishers and journalists. Even if Google as
a company does not decide on data processing, search
engine activity makes data, in principle, accessible to
internet users, including those who otherwise would
not have found the original page (§36). It also allows
users to get a ‘‘structured overview’’ of the information
relating to a person, ‘‘enabling them to establish a more
or less detailed profile’’ (§37). This affects the privacy of
the persons concerned in different and more incisive
ways than publishing the information. The processing
of data by Google is more subtle but more dangerous
than the one by publishers and journalists, therefore the
company is charged with suppressing the links to
people who require it, even if the publication is lawful
and the information remains available.7
This decision implies, without making it explicit, a
specific definition of social memory and forgetting. Is
memory the ability to store information in an arch-
ive, even if it is inaccessible? Or does it depend on
the ability to find the information when you need it?
Is memory storage or is it remembering?8 Ascribing
to Google the management of the right to oblivion
implies a clear choice: data are considered forgotten
if they are made difficult to trace (acting on search
engines), while social memory should be preserved by
the storage of data in the pages of newspapers and in
other archives.
David Drummond, general counsel of Google, com-
menting on the judgment of the European Court com-
plained that it puts Google in a sort of no man’s land,9
without any of the protections that legislation provides
to media, archives, and other communication tools.10
The ruling does not consider the specificity of the com-
pany and does not comment on its claims regarding the
unprecedented autonomy of the operation of algo-
rithms. Google acts on the data without knowing and
without controlling them, therefore it is neither a
library, a catalog, a newspaper, a newsstand, nor a ser-
vice provider. Google is a search engine.
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Search engines are not active as newspapers,
publishers, and libraries, which select and organize
the information to be disclosed, but are not even pas-
sive as pure intermediaries, which merely provide access
to materials they did not choose and do not know. The
information users receive in response to their requests is
organized, selected, and ranked in a way that had not
been previously decided by anyone and cannot be
attributed to none other than the search engine.
Search engines give access to information they pro-
duced themselves (Toobin, 2014). But how do algo-
rithms produce it, and do they understand it?
Data-driven agency
The legislation collides with the difficulties related to
new forms of agency in the digital world
(Hildebrandt, 2015). The actor that selected and
produced the additional information in Google is an
algorithm (PageRank or similar), which uses the avail-
able signals to produce information that was foreseen
neither by the programmers nor by the authors nor by
the user. The produced information, if it was known to
someone, was only known to the algorithm – but does it
make sense to say that the algorithm knows it? And
does it make sense to hold it accountable?
Algorithms process data (and manage information)
in a different way than human information processing
and understanding – and this is the root of the success
of Big Data. The recent approach of Big Data is actu-
ally quite distant from the models of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) from the 1970s and 1980s, that
aimed, by imitation or by analogy (‘‘strong’’ and
‘‘weak’’ AI) at reproducing with a machine the pro-
cesses of human intelligence (Nilsson, 2010). Now this
is no longer what the systems do, and some designers
declare it explicitly: ‘‘We do not try and copy intelli-
gence’’ (Solon, 2012), it would be too heavy a burden.
Examples can be multiplied from all areas in which
algorithms are most successful. Translation programs
do not try to understand the documents and their
designers do not rely on any theory of language
(Boellstorff, 2013). Algorithms translate texts from
Chinese without knowing Chinese, and their program-
mers do not know it either. Spell checkers can correct
typographical errors in any language because they do
not know the languages or their (always different) spel-
ling rules. Digital assistants operate with words without
understanding what words mean and text-producing
algorithms ‘‘don’t reason like people in order to write
like people’’ (Hammond, 2015: 7). Algorithms compet-
ing with human players in chess, poker, and Go do not
have any knowledge of the games nor of the subtleties
of human strategies (Silver and Hassabis, 2016).
Recommendation programs using collaborative
filtering know absolutely nothing about the movies,
songs, or books they suggest and can operate as reliable
tastemakers (Grossman, 2010; Kitchin, 2014: 4).
Just as human beings first became able to fly when
they abandoned the idea of building machines that flap
their wings like birds,11 digital information processing
only managed to achieve the results that we see today
when it abandoned the ambition to reproduce in digital
form the processes of the human mind. Since they do
not try to resemble our consciousness, algorithms
become more and more able to act as competent com-
munication partners, responding appropriately to our
requests and providing information that no human
mind ever developed and that no human mind could
reconstruct.
Practices like machine learning and knowledge
discovery in databases allow algorithms to produce
information that does not start from meaningful elem-
ents—they do not process information. Algorithms
only process data. Data by themselves are not mean-
ingful. They are just numbers and figures, that only
become significant when processed and presented in a
context, producing information. Information requires
data, but data are not enough to have information.
The same data can be or not be informative for differ-
ent people and in different contexts, for example when a
communication is repeated. That there is a train strike
or a stock market crash is not informative any more
when you read the news for the second time on a dif-
ferent newspaper, although the data remain the same.
The same news can also be informative for someone but
not for others, who maybe are not interested in finance.
Referring to Bateson’s definition of information as a
‘‘difference that makes a difference’’ (Bateson, 1972:
582), we can say that data are differences (strike/no
strike) which become informative when they make a
difference for someone in a given moment (who, for
example, decides to go by car rather than by train, or
to stay at home).
Algorithms only process differences, from whatever
source and with whatever meaning. They only need
data that they get from the web, deriving them not
only from what we think but also from what we do
without thinking and without being aware of. Digital
machines are able to identify in the materials circulating
on the web patterns and correlations that no human
being identified, processing them in such a way as to
be informative for the users. Human beings, however,
need information. When communicated to users, the
results of algorithmic processing generate information
and have consequences (Agrawal, 2005; Hammond,
2015), but outgoing information does not need incom-
ing information. The revolutionary communicative
meaning of Big Data is the ability to do without infor-
mation while producing information. In Mireille
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Hildebrandt’s words: ‘‘We have moved from an infor-
mation society to a data-driven society’’ (Hildebrandt,
2015: 46).
The memory of the web society
When it uses algorithms, social memory shows this kind
of data-driven agency, working in a way different from
our familiar forms of memorizing and, thus, creating
different problems. Whereas in the past the problem of
memory was the inability to remember, now the prob-
lem of social memory is the inability to forget.12
Especially since the spread of the Web 2.0, with its vir-
tually unlimited capacity to store and process data, the
web seems to allow for a form of perfect remembering.
Our society seems to be able to remember everything.13
The default value automatically attained, if you don’t
decide otherwise, and which demands neither energy
nor attention, is now remembering—not forgetting
(Blanchette and Johnson, 2002). To remember has
become much easier and cheaper—remembering has
become the norm. Only as an exception, if it becomes
necessary, we do decide to forget.
Think of our everyday praxis on the web while
dealing with texts, pictures, and e-mails. We lack the
time to choose and to forget. Without deciding to pre-
serve anything, as habit we preserve everything, as the
machine invites us to do. To choose and to decide
requires more attention and time. Usually there is no
need to do so, due to the availability also of very effect-
ive techniques to search out interesting information in
the mass of data, as and when the need arises: for
example to find a particular message among the saved
e-mails. Then we remember everything, recording it in
the spaces (in the cloud) of a web which by itself does
not have any procedure to forget.14 The judgment of
the European Court reflects this approach: the problem
is the accessibility for internet users of citizens’ data in
the indelible archives of the web, and the law wants to
protect the ability of the web to forget (and the possi-
bility for the citizens to be forgotten).15
Thereby the web succeeds in managing and making
available an enormous amount of information. But
does it make sense to say that the web has unlimited
memory or even that it has a memory? Memory is not
just storage, and an efficient memory is not made of
unlimited data. Memory requires the ability to focus
and select data, and to produce information referring
to a meaningful context, which implies both the ability
to remember and the ability to forget.
When it comes to memory, not only everyday speech
but also a large part of scientific reflection basically
refer to the management of remembering. Increasing
memory is understood as increasing memories or
strengthening the ability to remember. In this view
forgetting appears only as the negation of memory
(Ricoeur, 2004: 412): if forgetting increases, remember-
ing decreases and vice versa. The opposite idea, that
forgetting is a key component of memory, required
for abstraction and reflection, is not new, but always
remained in the shadows. From Themistocles (Cicero,
de Oratore 2.74.299) on there have always been voices
claiming that the ability to forget is even more import-
ant than the ability to remember (Weinrich, 1996).
Remembering and forgetting are the two sides of
memory, both essential for its functioning (Esposito,
2002).
Forgetting is not the simple erasure of data. Instead,
it is an active mechanism that inhibits the memor-
ization of all stimuli except a few ones, enabling to
focus attention and to autonomously organize infor-
mation in one’s own processes (Anderson, 2003;
Hulbert and Anderson, 2008). Forgetting is needed
to focus on something and use past experience to act
in a flexible, context appropriate manner, not starting
from scratch each time but also not doing always the
same whenever the same situation occurs. One must be
able to distinguish the present moment from an eternal
presence of the past. Forgetting then is also needed to
be able to remember in a proper sense, building an
internal horizon of references and recursions to face
the present. The act of remembering produces and
requires a parallel forgetting (Hulbert and Anderson,
2008: 8).
The web, which stores all data in a kind of eternal
present (Lepore, 2015), is not able to forget but is not
even able to properly remember. The processing of data
is entrusted to algorithms, which do not use abstraction
and do not need it. Therefore, they can develop the
amazing efficiency that we observe in our everyday
use of the web. Algorithms such as PageRank are so
fast and powerful because they do not need to ‘‘under-
stand’’ the information on which they work in order to
classify and connect it in a way that becomes meaning-
ful for the users.16 The machine works without abstrac-
tion and without reference to meaning. Merely
calculating, algorithms manage to produce intelligent
and significant results not because they operate in an
intelligent way, but because they ‘‘parasitically’’ exploit
the intelligence and the attribution of meaning by the
users of the web, in a process that continuously feeds on
itself (Esposito, 2014). All successful web projects use,
in one way or another, ‘‘googlization’’ practices
(Rogers, 2013; Vaidhyanathan, 2011), harvesting, copy-
ing, aggregating, and processing data derived from user
behavior—as PageRank does to produce an updated
and efficient ranking of websites. Google uses links to
learn how important a page is, but also to learn what it
is about and to direct its own internal organization,
which is continuously renewed depending on the
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connections and affinities ‘‘discovered’’ in the oper-
ations of users (Langville and Meyer, 2006).
Dealing with data, algorithms that cannot abstract
behave like the memorists studied by Luria or like the
patients of hypermnestic syndrome (Erdelyi, 1996;
Luria, 1987; Parker et al., 2006)17 who cannot forget.
Like these patients, they are not able to activate the
mechanism that distinguishes what they are interested
in remembering. They are not able to build their own
abstract context that guides selection and forgetting.
Abstracting is actually remembering and forgetting.
Algorithms do not abstract, they merely calculate.
They do not properly remember and do not properly
forget.
When algorithms allow us to contextualize/forget
(and they do it: we get from Google selective lists of
links to sites that may be of interest to us), they can do
it not because they learn to select, but because they
‘‘import’’ in their procedures the selections made by
users and use them to guide their own behavior. The
criteria for deciding which sites are relevant and should
appear first in the list of search results are not produced
by the algorithm and are not even decided from the
beginning by programmers but are derived from the
choices of the users. A website is considered relevant
by the algorithm if many web users connected to it
many times.18 The context of the selection is derived
from previous contextualizations. The algorithm for-
gets what had been forgotten by the users.19
Forgetting without remembering
How can we deal with a social memory driven by algo-
rithms that do not understand and do not abstract, as
the memory of our digital society that derives from the
web the information circulating in communication?
How can we ensure at the same time the preservation
of the past and the openness of the future, when the
agents that manage data move in an eternal present,
without remembering and without forgetting?
The most evident aspect of digital media is a shift of
problem from analog memory. Our society was always
concerned with protecting the ability to remember
(storing and retrieving data), while today we are pri-
marily concerned with protecting the ability to forget
(contextualizing). But the two sides of memory have an
interesting asymmetry, known since ancient times. You
can decide to enhance remembering, and with ars mem-
oriae (Yates, 1966) we have for thousands of years elab-
orate techniques to do so. But we do not have an ars
oblivionalis as an effective technique to enhance forget-
ting (Lachmann, 1991: 11; Weinrich, 1997: 9ff). If you
want to forget and decide to do it, the most immediate
effect is the opposite of the intended one, because you
draw attention to the content at stake, increasing first
remembering.20 Remembering to forget is paradoxical,
and deciding to forget almost impossible.
Also on the web this kind of ‘‘boomerang effect’’ has
been observed. Reputation management sites on the
web (cf. reputation.com) warn that attempts to
remove content are often counterproductive
(Woodruff, 2014). Once the request of ‘‘forgetting’’
has been accepted by Google, when someone does a
search on a particular person, among the results
appears a warning that some of the contents have
been removed in the name of the right to be forgotten.
The obvious consequence is to increase curiosity and
interest in that content. Sites have been immediately
produced (like hiddenfromgoogle.com) that collect the
links removed because of the right to oblivion.
Wikipedia also released a list of links to articles that
Google had removed from its search engine in accord-
ance to the ‘‘right to be forgotten.’’21 Ironically, these
‘‘reminders’’ of the contents that the law requires to
forget are perfectly legal, because the ruling prohibits
only to keep the links to the pages, not the content of
the pages themselves, which continue to be available on
the websites of the newspapers or of the other sources
that diffused them.
Hindering remembering is not enough to produce
forgetting. You have to circumvent the paradox of
remembering to forget in an indirect, more complex
way. Mnemotechnics itself recognized that in order to
reinforce forgetting you should rather multiply the
range of available memories (Weinrich, 1996). If you
increase memories, every piece of information is lost in
the mass and becomes difficult to find, so in fact it is
lost as if it were forgotten. This practice never produced
an authentic technique (an ars oblivionalis) because of
human’s limited capacity to store and process data (to
remember) that would be overloaded by an unmanage-
able mass of memories. To be able to forget we would
have to give up the ability to remember. Algorithms,
however, do not have this problem because of their
virtually unlimited capability to manage data, which
is the basis of their excessive remembering but can
also be used to reinforce forgetting.
Thus, to control forgetting on the web in a manner
specific to algorithmic memory, one could adopt a pro-
cedure directly opposed to the practice of deleting con-
tents or making them unavailable. This is the direction
in which some recent techniques for protection of priv-
acy are going, which is often understood as protection
of forgetting. Strategies of ‘‘obfuscation’’ (Brunton and
Nissenbaum, 2015) have been designed to produce mis-
leading, false, or ambiguous data parallel to each trans-
action on the web—in practice multiplying the
production of information to hinder a meaningful con-
textualization. If together with every search for infor-
mation in the web, or together with any input of
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information on social media like FaceBook, a dedicated
software produces a mass of other entirely irrelevant
operations, it will be difficult to select and focus on
relevant information, i.e. to remember.22
These techniques, however, require an a priori selec-
tion of the memories you want to forget, for which you
activate the obfuscation process. But in many cases you
want to forget memories that you never thought to
have to forget, and these are the cases targeted by the
legislation on the right to be forgotten.23 There are pro-
posals, partly effective, that adopt the same approach
to produce a posteriori an equivalent of forgetting.
They act directly on Google’s search results through
the multiplication of information. When a person has
been publicly shamed on the web, they produce artifi-
cially fake sites with other independent information,
with the explicit purpose of pushing the shaming infor-
mation so far down the search result that it effectively
vanishes (Ronson, 2015: 214ff.). The service
ReputationDefender24 starts from the assumption that
‘‘deleting is impossible.’’ To combat negative or unde-
sired items about a person, they generate a wide range
of unique, high quality positive content about that
person and push it up in the search results. As a
result, ‘‘negative material gets dumped down to pages
where nobody will see it.’’
The idea is not to erase memories but to enhance
forgetting. When the algorithm multiplies data, it does
not pay attention to this process—it doesn’t ‘‘remember’’
it. The multiplication of memories goes on in the
machine without meaning and without understanding.
This proliferation makes each datum more marginal,
lost in the mass. As in forgetting, it becomes increasingly
difficult to find and to use, thereby fulfilling the right to
oblivion. The factual conditions of forgetting are carried
out without having to activate remembering, bypassing
in a sense the paradox of ars oblivionalis.
But artificial memory, as remembering and as for-
getting as well, requires constant maintenance.
Mnemotechnics work if you go on taking care of the
palaces and caves of memory (Bolzoni, 1995). Memory
athletes should not stop training (Foer, 2011).
Similarly, an effective artificial forgetting must always
be renewed, because Google constantly changes its
algorithms and its targets (Ronson, 2015: 267ff.;
Woodruff, 2014: 157). Forgetting does not happen
once and for all, as an erasure of memories. You
must reverse engineer Google and continue to renew
forgetting as an active process, producing more and
different memories with different strategies.
Data-driven memory
These forgetting strategies are ingenious but address
the issue of forgetting from the point of view of
information management: how is it possible to forget
the information available to search engines. They adopt
the same approach as the European Court of Justice.
But algorithms do not work with information. They
work with data, creating different problems.
The legislation on the right to be forgotten addresses
the indexing of pages in the search engine. When the
request of a citizen is accepted, the indexing is blocked
and Google is not allowed to provide a link when a
search is made, even if the data remain available in
their original location (e.g., the digital archive of a news-
paper). Google cannot deliver the information to the
users answering their query. It is like blocking the use
of the catalog of a library, while at the same time pre-
serving the books and other materials. This solution
corresponds to the legislator’s attempt to combine the
protection of forgetting with the parallel need to protect
memory. As Viviane Reding, the European
Commission’s vice-president, said: ‘‘It is clear that the
right to be forgotten cannot amount to a right of the
total erasure of history.’’ To preserve the openness of
the future one would not want to lose the past. All data
are still stored at the respective sites, but the ‘‘forgotten’’
items are no longer accessible via Google search. The
ruling acts on remembering, not on memory. This of
course leaves the users exposed to the boomerang
effect of forgetting, since the original pages continue
to be available on the web and can become accessible
(can be remembered) with different search tools (or even
with google.com or any of its sites outside Europe).
But there are deeper, more fundamental problems.
Google’s indexing, as the catalog of a library, delivers
information. The algorithm itself, however, as all algo-
rithms operating on the web, ‘‘feeds’’ on data, which
are much more diffused and much more extensive that
the information understood and thought by someone at
some time.25 Algorithms derive data from the informa-
tion available in materials on the web (texts, docu-
ments, videos, blogs, files of all types) and from the
information provided by users: their requests, recom-
mendations, comments, chats. They are also able to
extract data from information on information: the
metadata that describe content and properties of each
document, such as title, creator, subject, description,
publisher, contributors, type, format, identifier,
source, language, and much more. Each of this data
refer to a different context than the original informa-
tion, of which the author is usually not aware, and that
he does not explicitly intend to communicate. The
Internet of things and other forms of ambient intelli-
gence also produce a multitude of data individuals do
not realize, monitoring their behavior, their location,
their movements, and their relationships.
Moreover, and most importantly, algorithms are
able to use all these data for a variety of secondary
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uses largely independent of the intent or the original
context for which they were produced (Mayer-
Scho¨nberger and Cukier, 2013: 103), processing them
to find correlations and patterns with calculations that
the human mind could not realize nor understand, but
which become informative. These include curious
examples such as the fact that vegetarians miss fewer
flights (Siegel, 2016), or that the divorce rate in Maine
correlates with per capita consumption of margarine
(http://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations). But
such secondary use of data also makes it possible to
gain information relevant for the profiling and surveil-
lance of citizens.
In these processes algorithms use the ‘‘data exhaust’’
(Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier, 2013: 6) or the ‘‘data
shadows’’ (Koops, 2011) generated as by-product by
people’s activities on the web and, increasingly, in the
world at large. It is a sort of ‘‘data afterlife’’ (Adkins
and Lury, 2012: 6) which goes far beyond the represen-
tational quality of numbers and of information and
depends on the autonomous activity of algorithms.
Each difference makes a difference in many different
ways, more and more independent from the original
difference. Algorithms use data to produce information
that cannot be attributed to any human being. In a
way, algorithms remember memories that had never
been thought by anyone.
This is a great opportunity for the social manage-
ment of information, but also a most serious threat to
the freedom of self-determination of individuals and to
the possibility of an open future. Information can be
inaccessible to the indexing in accordance with the right
to be forgotten, while data continue to be remembered
and used by the algorithms to produce different infor-
mation (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015: 355).26 Moreover,
the implementation of the right to be forgotten involves
itself the collection of a lot of metadata on which per-
sonal data can be used on what purpose, revealing per-
sonal preferences that, albeit anonymized, can be
exploited for profiling (Custers, 2016).
Conclusion
The current legislation on the right to be forgotten on
Google addresses the problems of digital memory in
ways that still refer to human processes of memory
and communication, supported by analog media.27
The difficulties that arise signal that to handle and regu-
late digital forms of ‘‘second-order memory’’ we need a
more radical approach (Koops, 2011: 250). Digital
algorithms-based memory is not made of information,
but uses the information recorded in communication
(primary memory) to get its data, that are often differ-
ent from those on which the original information was
based, and partly uncontrollable. This is not to say that
the production and circulation of memories cannot be
controlled, because the need for control rather increases
with the power of algorithms. As the most effective
proposals to manage the excess of data show, however,
the problems are different. We must face algorithms
directly as autonomous agents, with processes, proced-
ures, and problems that cannot be traced back to our
familiar forms of attribution and accountability. This is
what Google claimed in the European Court case on
the right to be forgotten, and what the ruling left
unanswered.
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Notes
1. The dataset on which algorithms work is always related to
human intervention: it includes only the data that have
been provided, could be different if it were set in another
way, and many of the data result from the behavior and
decisions of individuals. The procedures of algorithms,
moreover, are clearly the outcome of human design with
its references and its biases, also in the cases in which the
designers themselves do not know the details of the work-
ing of the machines.
2. The responsibility of algorithms could also be extended to







4. Cf., for example: http://www.scientificamerican.com/art
icle/the-internet-never-forgets/.
5. ‘‘Zu allem Handeln geho¨rt Vergessen (. . .); es ist mo¨glich
fast ohne Erinnerung zu leben, ja glu¨cklich zu leben, wie
das Tier zeigt; es ist aber ganz und gar unmo¨glich, ohne
Vergessen u¨berhaupt zu leben’’ (Nietzsche, 1874:
116)—‘‘all action requires forgetting (. . .); it is possible to
live almost without remembering, it is even possible to live
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happily, as animals show. But it is absolutely impossible
to live without forgetting.’’
6. On the distinction between responsibility and account-
ability, cf. Simon (2012). According to Simon, responsi-
bility would require intentionality, which cannot be
attributed to technical artifacts. Algorithms may be
accountable, but should not be made responsible –
which of course leaves the issue of responsibility open.
7. Google not only has the task of suppressing the links, but
also of deciding whether to accept the requests of ‘‘being
forgotten,’’ balancing them with the public right to infor-
mation. This raises an important question of legitimacy
(Ambrose, 2015). With which right can a private entity
take decisions of public importance, without having being
elected or appointed with a transparent procedure, and
even without specification of the criteria to be followed in
the decision (if and how long data can be considered of
public interest, who are the private individuals to protect,
when should the right to privacy of the individual prevail
over public access)? Citizens still have the possibility of
appealing to the judicial authority (§82), but this is a
second step.
8. The extensive debate on cultural memory is focused on
the definition of social memory referring to this question.
Starting with Halbwachs’ (1952) classic text, cf. Assmann
(1992), Assmann and Ho¨lscher (1988), and Esposito
(2002).
9. Google tried to get directives and guidelines in a series of
meetings and discussions organized in 2014 in a tour of
European capitals. As it could be expected, the results
were more media than content – but this does not make
the move less meaningful from the point of view of the
company and of the management of its decision-making
responsibility.
10. The legislation on the right to be forgotten includes a
‘‘media exception’’ for the processing of personal data
‘‘carried out solely for journalistic purposes’’ (§9;
Rosen, 2012). But also archives and catalogs are pro-
tected: there is a further exception for processing data
for historical, statistical, and scientific research purposes
(§7; Van Hoboken, 2013: 20). Intermediaries, on the other
hand, are not held responsible if they do not know the
information to which they provide access (van Hoboken,
2013: 26)—as stated in the EU directive on electronic
commerce that establishes a ‘‘safe harbor’’ for Internet
service providers that operate as ‘‘mere conduit.’’
11. The metaphor was used by Hans Blumenberg
(Blumenberg, 1957).
12. This is one of the points emphasized by Mayer-
Scho¨nberger (2009) in his book with the evocative title
Delete.
13. It even remembers the future, working as an ‘‘anticipa-
tion machine’’ which also answers questions not yet
asked. Google’s function ‘‘autocomplete’’ finishes writing
the question while you are typing the first few words. On
the emphasis about the predictive power of algorithms,
see Siegel (2016).
14. As many observers remark, however, the web also forgets
a lot, but again in different ways than our familiar
memory. Web content is ephemeral on many dimensions,
most of them new (Ambrose, 2012; Barone et al., 2015;
Chun, 2011; Lepore, 2015). Besides the classic problems
of physical rot (natural causes such as fire or flood) there
are technical problems like hardware, software or net-
work failures, viruses, accidental file deletion, changes
of media and protocols.) Moreover, there are all the dif-
ficulties of reference rot and link rot: contents that
become impossible to access, with the link producing
the infamous error messages 404: Page Not Found, or
pages that still exist but with a different URL (Davis,
2010). The average life of web pages is less than 100
days, and in many cases is better in measured in
hours rather than days (http://blogs.loc.gov/digitalpre
servation/2011/11/the-average-lifespan-of-a-webpage/).
Reacting to these problems, specialized tools for Web
Preservation have been developed, as permalinks
(https://perma.cc), the Wayback Machine (https://arch
ive.org/web/) or Google’s Cache.
15. The two aspects of forgetting are obviously different, as
highlighted by Rouvroy (2008), who distinguishes the
interest to forget from the interest (or even the right) to
be forgotten. The first aspect concerns the possibility of
projecting an open future, the second the desire not to be
bound by the past (or by certain portions of it) in one’s
social identity. In the debate on the European ruling,
however, the two issues overlap and in this context I
will not consider the differences. Nobody, however,
wants to forget or be forgotten altogether, and in this
sense the expression ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ is somehow
misleading.
16. Unlike other tools such as AltaVista, Google is not based
on a predetermined semantic data grid, but derives its
classification from the data examined: meaning is the
result of the processing, not its premise.
17. Narratively reproduced as Funes in Borges’ (1962)
famous short story.
18. And if relevant users link to it—while users are relevant if
they themselves are linked by others (Page et al., 1999).
19. And somehow learns, because machine learning tech-
niques use selections also to orient the subsequent beha-
vior – but not because it understands the contents.
20. Cf. Eco (1987). For the web it is called ‘‘Streisand effect,’’
similar to the one known and widely studied about cen-
sorship—the reason why one should usually refrain from
suing defamatory articles, to avoid spreading the news
even more: politicians, actors, and all public figures
know it very well.
21. An ‘‘index of the de-indexed’’: cf. Binns (2016).
22. With a similar attitude, FaceCloak generates fictitious
information to oppose the excess of individual transpar-
ency on Facebook by creating, parallel to sensitive data, a
series of completely irrelevant invented information.
There are also procedures which generate whenever you
do a query on Google a series of parallel ghost queries
that make it difficult for companies to identify your pat-
tern of preferences.
23. The most complex aspect of reputation management is
repair (Woodruff, 2014). Ausloos (2012) observes that




25. ‘‘Most of the Digital Universe are unstructured data’’:
IDC—IVIEW 2010.
26. The same problems arise in the debate about digital priv-
acy, which in its most refined forms also refers to the
problem of preserving the self-determination of individ-
uals as possibility of reinvention (Solove, 2007a, 2007b,
2011). Here the advocates of privacy claim the protection
of ‘‘contextual integrity’’ (Nissenbaum, 2004: 137): you
should not allow the use of data in contexts that are
inappropriate to the original one. The difficulty, however,
is that in many cases the working of algorithms com-
pletely disregards the context.
27. According to Ausloos (2012: 11), the very idea that indi-
viduals can have control of their data might be only a
remainder of the preinternet era where the default was
forgetting.
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